New Missions for Japan
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By David A. Fulghum
The Japanese government has its worries - North Korean ballistic missiles, advanced Chinese fighters and cruise missiles, as well as disputed islands and a dearth of bases and modern aircraft to protect them. These problems are coupled with a military force structure that cannot expand and a defense budget that is unlikely to grow.
Such pressures are forcing the government to carefully sort through conflicting priorities that include:
· What specifically should be protected?
· What are the modernization options?
· How should an international expeditionary force be fielded that would not be seen as a military threat by its neighbors?
The government also is trying to shake off the need to rely so heavily on Japanese industry, which has produced, for example, extremely expensive versions of the F-16 fighter and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter.
To date, Japan has modernized with Aegis destroyers and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors to counter ballistic missiles; KC-767 aerial tankers to extend deployment ranges, and E-767 AWACS to help monitor the approaches to the mainland.
However, the military does not have a supersonic cruise fighter like the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor to chase down cruise missiles and replace the geriatric F-4J Phantoms, or long-endurance UAVs to ensure constant monitoring of islands and sea lanes that stretch almost to China. Also missing are low-collateral-damage, high-precision guided weapons to discourage invaders of far-away islands and long-range airlifters to allow participation in international activities such as anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean or natural-disaster relief to neighboring countries.
Meanwhile, political and budgetary problems in the U.S. and an unstable government in Japan make F-22 acquisition a long shot. Killing production for the U.S. Air Force would make the aircraft too expensive for the Japanese and focus the defense ministry on alternatives such as the Eurofighter Typhoon. The latter, along with the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, will constitute Britain's high-low mix of advanced fighters.
Moreover, getting the green light for the F-22 from the Japanese parliament is not a sure thing. Because of his growing unpopularity - underscored by a big loss by his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in local elections this month - Prime Minister Taro Aso called for a general election on Aug. 30, more than a month earlier than anticipated. The public discontent with Aso and the LDP is fed by a prolonged recession, which could affect defense acquisition.
"The Japanese want the F-22," says Lt. Gen. Chip Utterback, commander of the 13th Air Force at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. "But they are actually looking for a capability and not a particular aircraft. It's just that the F-22 is the only fighter in the world that can do what they want. They see the [foreign] threat horizon not getting any better. They understand that as [foreign] capabilities increase, they will need the ability to look and shoot from a long way off.
"I got to fly the Su-30MKI [the Indian variant of China's Su-30MKK]," he says. "I did everything I possibly could to put it out of control and couldn't do it. It's extremely stable and responsive. It's much more reliable and capable than the MiG-29."
In general, the Japanese want the Raptor's supersonic cruise (about Mach 1.6) and an operational altitude of 65,000 ft. for a larger radar and electronic surveillance footprint. Other attractions of the Raptor are an active, electronically scanned array radar with a range of about 130 mi. - which is, incidentally, about the range from the western edge of the Japanese Southwest Air Div.'s area of responsibility and the east coast of China - and the ability to find small objects such as cruise missiles and other stealthy aircraft. The Raptor also provides the radar reflectivity of a steel marble; this would allow it to close in on invading aircraft without being detected.
"The F-22 gives the U.S. an ability to get inside the [enemy's air defense] threat rings - to be offensive and to do things we can't do with conventional fighters," Utterback says. "The Japanese have a different perspective. They want to optimize their capabilities to defend the homeland. F-22 gives them that standoff defensive capability. The F-35 does not.
"The Japanese are good pilots and tactically capable," he says. "I have been flying with them since 1979. Today, it is a competent and capable air force, and they are imaginative in their tactics."
In Japan, there has always been the discussion of whether to focus on an expeditionary military or one that is focused on the defense of Japan. The question is, Can the budget afford both?
"An easy case can be made that if you target your investments the right way - whether it be lift, sustainment, ISR or C4 systems - you can build capability that gives you both options," says a Tokyo-based U.S. official who monitors Japan's defense activities. "I believe the Japanese government is dedicated to both sets of missions. How they get there will be the challenge. They've already gone down the path of inflight refueling [KC-767], long-range lift [C-X], and the Huaga-class destroyer with helicopter capability that can be used for humanitarian operations. Completing those capabilities will drive budget discussions."
"In balancing force structure, a smaller force with fifth-generation stealth capability begins to make sense when you're defending your home island," says Utterback. "For us, smaller numbers impact on the ability to be forward. They could do it with less."
Japanese industry's choke hold on defense spending appears to have slackened owing to the pressures of functioning in a global economy.
"[Japanese-based] industry remains an important factor in procurement decisions, but it's not the overarching force it used to be," says the U.S. official. "Twenty years ago when the Japan Air Self-Defense Force [JASDF] didn't have such a critical operational role working with the U.S. in responding to threats, there was a bit more willingness to indulge in domestic production as a priority. Now the overriding concern is operational effectiveness and capabilities."
