USAF Bomber Grounded by More than Budget
By David A. Fulghum 
The now delayed 2018-version of the Next Generation Bomber was derailed by more than the budget. In fact, Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, commander of the 8th Air Force with responsibility for nuclear deterrence and global strike, says it is not dead, just the victim of a postponement.
“What we were looking for in the 2018 bomber was something that would take the B-2 capabilities to a new level, like the F-22 improved on the F-117,” Elder says. “It was stealthier and easier to maintain and from an operational standpoint that’s what you’re looking for.”
In fact, there were two key, inter-related issues that created the bomber reassessment: adding a nuclear weapons carrying capability and renewed Start arms control treaty negotiations with the Russians.
The delay provides breathing space while “we understand the Start negotiations and some of the other [new weapons,] applications,” Elder says. “With Start, you don’t want to lock yourself into an airplane [design] before you know what the accounting rules are.” And the U.S. military may want to change its approach to standoff weaponry.
“The Russians are looking at bombers, and the counting rules for bombers are pretty onerous,” Elder says. “One of the issues is that they count the number of warheads that a bomber is capable of carrying, not its operational load-out. For example, the B-52 is counted as carrying more weapons than it does operationally. That [bomber design] is inefficient for negotiations.”
Meantime, not only is the Next-Generation Bomber delayed, the electronic warfare and attack capabilities that would help it penetrate enemy air defenses – by disrupting radar and communications -- are also in disarray.
“The legacy platforms we have, we’re going to have to find another way to provide that same electronic attack capability” once provided by the EF-11 and EA-6B, says Elder, who spoke to defense reporters in Washington this week. “The AF is looking at some different approaches that take advantage of stealth in F-22 and F-35 by packaging [all stealthy platforms together]. The capabilities on these platforms is part of the reason the Air Force has been less concerned.”
If a target is protected by Russian-made SA-20s, that means you have to use standoff weapons or a packaged stealth force, the general explained. The U.S. Air Force is looking at a number of ways of doing electronic attack without dedicated platforms.
For F-22 and F-35, the requirements for electronic attack aren’t nearly as high. But when you talk about B-1 and B-52, they are going to have trouble operating in an SA-20 environment. Unmanned jammers could be part of that, he said.
Credit: Defense Technology International
