Report of F-35 Data Theft Spotlights Flaws
David A. Fulghum davef@aviationweek.com
Graham Warwick graham_warwick@aviationweek.com
Claims that unknown attackers used Chinese Internet hosts as a conduit to break into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project to scoop up terabytes of design and electronic systems data are being denied by the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin -- kind of.
"Representation of successful cyber attacks on the F-35 program [are] incorrect," according to a Lockheed Martin official. However, the statement was amended with the caveat that "to our knowledge there has never been any classified information breach [despite] attacks on our systems continually." A Pentagon spokesman says there are "no special concerns." The reactions came in response to a Wall Street Journal article that sourced six current and former officials familiar with the event.
True or not, such breaches are attempted with regularity. And those breakdowns in security, says U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, the USAF's network-centric operations chief, may well be traceable to breakdowns in common sense.
"The F-35 has hundreds of suppliers that have to be networked together," Elder says. "So you have to build a way to share information, but that's when you run a risk. The fact is that anytime you prepare an e-mail you ought to think that someone is going to read it that you don't want to."
U.S. officials have often described China's IT environment as the "Wild West," where anyone can do almost anything without worry of official interference. Because of the difficulty of tracing intrusions across international countries, hackers, spies and criminals from Eastern Europe and Russia regularly use China as a conduit for their activities.
While the attack and intrusion threat is real and growing, the actual danger is far less certain because attackers work in the same digital wilderness as the defenders.
"There is a huge focus on this in terms of data loss and data gain," says Elder, commander of 8th Air Force with responsibility for strategic deterrence and global strike. "The reality is that the big concern we should have...is an adversary that manipulates the data. Unless you have some [safeguards] in place, you may not know it has happened."
Moreover, even when data is stolen, it may not be what was targeted or it may be of no use because it is encrypted.
"It's one thing for people to get inside your system," Elder says. "It's another for them to do something with it. For example, if you're using [Microsoft] Windows, there are all sorts of encryption capabilities. Also you can cut yourself off from the network except when you want to be on. [Intruders] typically play with your networks in [your] off-hours. So when you're not at home, you lock the house. We need to start thinking the same way about cyber."
Elder also contends that U.S. Internet users, even those in the military, have been naýýve about protection and security.
"We as a nation are content to put a wall around the network to protect us," he says. "We don't deal with the fact that there might already be someone inside the wall that is a threat to us."
Another part of the solution is to train a much larger cyber warfare force. That particular effort has captured the interest of Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
Cyber warfare is "going to be one of the significant new realms of conflict," Gates told students at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Ala. But, he warns, "We are desperately short of people who have capabilities in this area in all the services."
Gates said that "I'm looking at establishing a sub-unified command [within] Stracom for cyber that would encompass [the National Security Agency] and various other capabilities." He plans to "significantly increase the throughput of training of experts in cyber. We graduate about 80 students a year from our cyber schools right now. We're going to quadruple that by Fiscal 2011. The service chiefs have basically been told that filling all the slots in the cyber school is their first priority."
Photo credit: U.S. Air Force
