CSAR 130 Shift Draws Criticism
Feb 13, 2009
By Michael Fabey
Editor’s Note: These articles are part of an exclusive series on combat, search and rescue (CSAR) that originally ran in Aerospace Daily & Defense Report in late January 2009.
A recent decision by Pentagon acquisition chief John Young to cut out the HC-130Js the U.S. Air Force wanted to buy for combat, search and rescue (CSAR) missions has drawn the ire of military leaders – including combatant commanders who say they need the aircraft and its capabilities.
Young instead shifted nearly all the Air Force resources programmed for the HC-130J to a similar aircraft, the MC-130J, destined for Special Operations Command (SOCOM), citing a lack of need for the rescue variant, according to a draft acquisition memorandum.
In a Jan. 8 e-mail to Young, Gen. William Ward, commander of the new African Command (AFRICOM), said, “I also would recommend against deferring HC-130Js from the program. The ranges and added performance features required for potential personnel recovery activities in Africa, as available in the HC-130J, are absolutely needed. Both aircraft will play an important role in AFRICOM.”
Renuart letter
The same day, NORAD and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) chief Gen. Victor Renuart sent Young an e-mail saying, “I commanded the HC-130 units during my tenure as Wing Commander of the 347th Wing at Moody. Our current active duty HC-130 fleet is based on the oldest airframes in the inventory. The need to modernize these airframes is critical, both in terms of recapitalization and mission effectiveness.”
He continued, “The added performance of the ‘J’ models would have prevented a couple mishaps we had in the early days of combat rescues in Afghanistan and the much improved systems integration and cockpit design of the HC-130J will provide our CSAR crews the best chance for success in a very tough mission environment.”
Renuart also told Young, “I was surprised at the choice to drop the HC configuration and would ask your reconsideration.
“Finally, as the combatant commander tasked with Homeland SAR for the nation, I believe our capability to conduct long range, overwater SAR (which we conduct numerous times each year) is limited by the aging aircraft (both HC-130 and HH-60s) in our inventory and we desperately need to recapitalize that fleet. I am a strong supporter of both the HC-130J and CSAR-X and hope we can move BOTH forward quickly.”
Young said he diverted the 130s to SOCOM because the command had shown a genuine need for the aircraft, making a request for replacements months ago.
“SOCOM had called me and told me it was very important,” Young told Aerospace DAILY. “When combatant commanders call me like that, I listen.”
As for the later e-mails, Young said they seemed to him to be part of an effort by the Air Force to force the Pentagon to ante up for aircraft without going through all the proper procedures.
The Air Force, Young said, seemed essentially to be trying to pull off an end-around: pushing through a sole-source urgent need contract for a few aircraft with the intent to get more aircraft in the same manner later, instead of asking for all of the aircraft at once and proving the need from the very beginning.
“I’m not just going to approve a bunch of aircraft,” Young said, likening the Air Force maneuver to “cheating.”
White paper
Air Force Col. Michael Healy countered in a CSAR white paper circulated amongst Air Staff officers and now making the rounds in Congress (Aerospace DAILY, Jan. 28) that despite Young’s claims, the SOCOM requirement was “‘added on’ to the requirements documents and analysis submitted and approved for HC-130J, not vice versa.”
Healy added, “These actions are also surprising in the face of Joint Staff validated requirements for both aircraft and multiple Combatant Commander (COCOM) requests for these specific AF rescue capabilities. But most troubling is that these actions insert the Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) into a position where he is able to overrule Joint Staff and Service processes for determining not only military requirements, but service roles and missions through their support (or lack of it) for major acquisition programs.”
Healy also said, “Apparently this shift in support is based solely on Mr. Young’s or his staff’s insight into COCOM needs, since it contradicts every official process used to make these decisions. This should be of grave concern to OSD Policy, the COCOMs, the Joint Chiefs and their Staffs, not to mention the Congress, [all of whom] have the formal responsibility of determining the roles and missions of military services.”
The Air Force has not endorsed Healy’s comments. Young called the colonel’s paper “an outrage.”
Photo: DoD
